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Abstract
This paper determines the equilibrium market structure in a mixed in-
ternational oligopoly, where the state assets are sold at an auction. The
model suggests that low green￿eld costs and low trade costs induce foreign
acquisitions. The intuition is that domestic ￿rms can then not prevent for-
eign ￿rms from becoming strong competitors and thus, their willingness to
pay for the state assets is low. We also ￿nd that pro￿t shifting from do-
mestic to foreign ￿rms generated by National Treatments clauses is partly
paid for by the foreign investor in the bidding competition over the state
assets.
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Privatizations have become an important part of industrial restructuring in all
parts of the world. Since 1990, European governments have sold more than $450
billion-worth of state assets in many diﬀerent sectors, including the banking, in-
surance, telecommunication and automobile industries. Many countries also an-
nounce substantial forthcoming privatizations.1
In what follows, with privatizations we refer to the selling of state assets. This
de￿nition incorporates the selling of state owned enterprises but also includes
cases where the government has stepped in to rescue a failing ￿rm which has later
been sold oﬀ. In South Korea, for instance, the government has recently sold the
failing car producers Daewoo and Kia.
Foreign competition is an important element in many of these sales. In Europe,
on average, about 30 % of the privatized ￿rms in the 1990￿s were acquired by
foreign investors. Moreover, in many of the sales, bidding competition between
domestic and foreign investors took place. In South Korea, the domestic car-
producer Hyundai acquired Kia in competition with FORD. (The Economist,
1998). Later, FORD outbid alliances formed by Daimler-Chrysler and Hyundai
and GM and FIAT, and acquired Daewoo.(Financial Times, 2000).2
Many of these privatizations take place in a time of on-going investment and
1In the ￿rst seven months of the year 2000, about 150 privatizations was under way in the
EU (Thompson Financial Securities). Still more privatizations are to be expected. In Greece,
for instance, a large privatization program is discussed as part of a structural reform before
joining the euro-zone. ( FT Euro, 1999 and the The Economist, 2000).
2Other examples include the privatization of the Italian car producer Alfa Romeo in 1987,
where FIAT did outbid FORD (Thompson Financial Securities). The Swedish postal state
company￿s banking division, Postgirot, is about to be sold to an alliance of Swedish banks in
competition with several foreign competitors (Dagens Industri, 2000).
2trade liberalization.3 This suggests that the outcome of the sale of the state assets
will interact with the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) and international
trade. The purpose of this paper is to analyze this interaction. To this end,
we consider a two-country partial equilibrium model. At the outset, a state-
owned enterprise and a privately owned domestic ￿rm are located in the domestic
market. There is also a foreign ￿rm located in a foreign country. It is assumed
that the government in the domestic country will deregulate the market through a
program with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii) allowing
for new plants to be opened by foreigners, i.e. allowing for green￿eld investments
by reducing investment restrictions. In the ￿rst stage, the state assets are sold at
a simultaneous bid auction, where the two private ￿rms are potential buyers.4 In
the second stage, the foreign ￿r mc a ne x p a n db yi n v e s t i n gg r e e n ￿eld, i.e. setting
up a new plant, if it did not obtain the state assets in the ￿rst stage. In the third
stage, the ￿rms sell a homogenous product and the foreign ￿rm faces a trade cost
in addition to its normal production costs, if it has not invested in the market.5
3The trend towards greater liberalization has been strong in recent years. Over the period
1991-1996, approximately 95 per cent of a total of 599 changes in the regulatory FDI regimes
of countries were in the direction of liberalization. The changes mostly involved the opening of
industries previously closed to FDI (World Investment Report 1997).
4In this case, the identity of the buyer aﬀects the pro￿ts of all ￿rms. This interdependence
constitutes a fundamental diﬃculty when determining the buyer, since the price a potential
buyer is willing to pay for the assets depends on who might otherwise obtain them. Our study
will use the approach taken by Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996), who analyze auctions where the
bidders￿ valuations of an auctioned item depend on the other bidders￿ identities.
5It is not necessary to assume green￿eld investment to previously have been forbidden, what
is required is that green￿eld costs have initially been high enough to prevent green￿eld entry
and that such costs might be reduced.
Moreover, for the main results in the paper, it is not necessary to assume that the privatization
takes place before the green￿eld investment liberalization. What is required, is that, at the time
of the deregulation, the foreign ￿rm is located outside the domestic market.
3Our main result is that low green￿eld costs and low trade cost induce for-
eign acquisitions. This seems counterintuitive at ￿rst sight, since lower green￿eld
costs would be expected to lead to more green￿eld entry rather than entry by
acquisition, and that lower trade costs would lead to more exports rather than
entry.6 However, this result is intuitive, when taking into account that the levels
of green￿eld costs and trade costs aﬀect the acquisition price. In order to explain
the eﬀect of the trade cost, consider a situation where green￿eld costs are high
enough to prevent green￿eld entry. In this situation, the domestic ￿rm is willing
to pay a high price for the state assets when trade costs are high, since the foreign
￿rm must then export facing high trade costs. However, when trade costs are
low, the domestic ￿rm can no longer prevent the foreign ￿rm from becoming a
strong competitor and thus, its willingness to pay for the state assets decreases.
Similarly, when green￿eld cost are low, the domestic ￿rm cannot prevent the for-
eign ￿rm from becoming a locally strong competitor and thus, its willingness to
pay for the state assets is low. Consequently, a foreign acquisition becomes more
likely when trade and green￿eld costs are low.7
Acquisitions by foreign ￿rms in privatizations are not only quantitatively sig-
ni￿cant; in policy making they are also often viewed diﬀerently than those made
by domestic ￿rms. For instance, many countries restrict the right of foreign in-
dividuals and ￿rms to acquire domestic ￿rms, or apply special restrictions to
foreign ￿rms in certain industries. On the other hand, many countries negotiate
over so called ￿National Treatment￿ (NT) clauses, which set out the commitments
of countries to treat foreign-controlled ￿rms operating in their territories no less
6See, for instance, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (1998) and
Motta (1992) for papers dealing with the trade oﬀ between exports and FDI.
7Horn and Persson (2000) showed that domestic ￿rms have incentives to merge for suﬃciently
high trade barriers in order to prevent international mergers in a merger formation model without
green￿eld investment.
4favorably than domestic enterprises in similar situations.8
In the policy debate, NT has been questioned on the ground that it might lead
to FDI which ￿crowd out￿ domestic investments and shift pro￿ts from domestic
to foreign ￿rms.9 Moreover, it has been shown in the theoretical literature on
MNEs that FDI, under some circumstances, can reduce domestic welfare due to
pro￿t shifts from domestic to foreign ￿rms.10 Here, we will illuminate this issue
in the context of privatizations. We show that crowding out is partly mitigated
when entry takes place through an acquisition. The reason is that the foreign
￿rm pays a price for the state assets equal to the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation of the
assets. But the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation of the assets is precisely the negative
impact on this ￿rm through the decline in pro￿ts created by the foreign acquisi-
tion. This result illustrates a fundamental diﬀerence between foreign entry in the
context of acquisition and green￿eld investment. In the case where only green￿eld
entry is an option, the foreign ￿rm will pay a ￿xed entry cost which only covers
the opportunity cost in terms of factor inputs. However, the negative eﬀect on
the domestic ￿rm￿s pro￿t is not ￿paid for￿. Consequently, the argument that
a national treatment clause will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting
pro￿ts from domestic agents to foreign ￿rms seems less relevant when applied to
privatizations.
8For instance, Bolivia and the United States signed a bilateral treaty in April 1998 including
a national treatment clause. Article II.1 in this treaty states: ￿With respect to the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of
covered investments, each Party shall accord treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like
situations, to investments in its territory of its own nationals or companies (hereinafter ￿national
treatment￿)...￿ (World Investment Report 1999).
9See World Investment Report 1999. Moreover, deregulation and privatization was one of
the main subjects discussed in the pre-UNCTAD X Seminar 1999.
10See, for instance, Horstmann and Markusen (1992). Note that FDI increases domestic
welfare in many circumstances in these models.
5The related theoretical literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and multi-
national enterprises (MNE) is surveyed in Markusen (1995). However, this litera-
ture does not explicitly address the question of whether entry into a foreign market
is green￿eld or through the acquisition of assets already in the market, or both.
This issue is at focus in our study, however.11 Furthermore, to our knowledge, no
paper in the privatization literature deals with determining the equilibrium buyer
in a situation where the potential buyers compete in an international oligopoly.12
The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium
market structure. In Section 4, we make some observations concerning privatiza-
tion, investment and trade policies. Section 5 discusses the robustness of some of
the results in the paper. Section 6 concludes. Finally, most proofs appear in the
Appendix.
2. The Model
There are two countries, country H and country F. At the outset, a state-owned
enterprise and a privately owned domestic ￿rm, ￿rm d,a r el o c a t e di nam a r k e t
in country H. There is also a foreign ￿rm, ￿rm f, located in country F. In the
following, we shall focus the analysis on the market in country H. It is assumed
that the government in country H will liberalize the market through a program
11The paper by Horn and Persson (2000) is related to our study, but in that paper, FDI takes
place only by acquistions. See Bjorvatn (2000) and G￿rg (1997) for papers addressing the choice
of entry mode into foreign markets. However, in these models, a foreign ￿rm is exogenously
assigned to be the acquirer. Thus, the equilibrium buyer is not endogenously determined.
12For overviews of the privatization literature see, for instance, Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997)
and Vickers and Yarrow (1991).
Cornelli and Li (1997) analyze the optimal schemes for privatization of state enterprises when
foreign investors are potential buyers. However, they do not explicitly model the product market,
and thus abstract from how the privatization outcome interacts with FDI and trade.
6with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii) allowing for new
plants to be opened by foreigners, i.e. allowing for green￿eld investments by
abolishing investment restrictions. It is not necessary to assume that green￿eld
investments were previously forbidden. What is required is that the green￿eld
costs have initially been high enough to prevent green￿e l de n t r ya n dt h a ts u c h
costs might be reduced.13
As illustrated in ￿gure 2.1, the interaction takes place in three stages. In the
￿rst stage, the government sells the state assets, denoted kS, in one piece at an
auction where the domestic ￿rm and the foreign ￿rm are the two potential buyers.
In the second stage, the foreign ￿rm has the option to invest in new private assets,
denoted kP, in country H, i.e. to undertake green￿eld investments. In order to
simplify the analysis, investment is assumed to be a dichotomous choice.14 Finally,
in the third stage, both ￿rms sell a homogenous product in the market in country
H and the foreign ￿rm faces a trade cost in addition to its normal production
costs, unless it has invested green￿eld.15
Section 2.1 describes the oligopoly market, and the following section presents
the privatization procedure.
13Note also that it is of no consequence whether the market was previously open to imports
or not.
14It can be shown that the main ￿ndings in this paper would also be valid when capital is a
continuous variable. However, the derivations then become much more tedious.
15The choice of timing between the acquisition and the green￿eld investment is not obvious
in a general setting. In this particular application, however, it seems natural for the acquisition
decision to be made before the foreign ￿rm￿s green￿eld decision, since the assets for sale already
exist in the market and entering green￿eld requires the construction of a new plant, which is
usually time consuming.
Note also that for the results in this paper, it is not necessary to assume that privatization
takes place before the green￿eld investment liberalization. What is required, is that the foreign
￿rm is located outside the country at the time of the deregulation.
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Figure 2.1: The three-stage game.
2.1. The Oligopoly market
In the third stage, ￿rms compete in Cournot fashion in a homogenous good mar-
ket. We assume ￿rms to face a concave inverse demand function, so that P 0(Q) < 0
and P00(Q) ≤ 0. Initially, each ￿rm possesses one unit of private assets kP in its
respective home country. In Lemma 1, it is shown that the state assets will be
sold at the auction in equilibrium. As illustrated by ￿gure 2.1, this implies that
three diﬀerent market structures are to be considered.16 To keep track of these, we
denote the market structure where the domestic ￿rm possesses kd units of assets
and the foreign ￿rm possesses kf units in country H, by M(kd,k f). For example,
16Note that a merger between the domestic and the foreign ￿rm is ruled out. There are two
basic ways in which a monopoly can be ruled out. One is to assume that the monopoly makes a
smaller pro￿t than the combined pro￿ts of less concentrated structures. The second reason why
a monopoly may not be formed is that such a merger would not be permitted by the competition
authorities. For simplicity, we stick to the latter interpretation.
8M(kP + kS,0) is then the duopoly where the domestic ￿rm owns both private
assets and the state assets, while the foreign ￿rm has no assets in country H and
exports from country F.
The last row in ￿gure 2.1 refers to the ￿rms￿ marginal costs in the diﬀerent
market structures. A ￿rm possessing at least one unit of assets is assumed to
produce at zero marginal cost. However, the foreign ￿rm has a cost disadvantage,
t, per unit of output when serving the market from country F, where t captures
the trade cost. We assume that the foreign ￿rm can avoid trade costs when
owning assets in country H, which can be achieved by acquiring the state assets
kS or entering green￿eld.17 To highlight the trade cost eﬀe c t s ,w ea s s u m et h a t
expanding above one unit of assets entails no production cost reduction.
Let πD
i (t) denote the duopoly pro￿tf o r￿rm i = d,f when the domestic ￿rm
faces a variable cost of zero and the foreign ￿rm faces a variable cost of t,a n d
let tmax be the t satisfying qf(t)=0 . πM denotes the monopoly pro￿t when the
monopolist faces a zero production cost.
2.2. The greenﬁeld investments
At this stage, the foreign ￿rm might undertake a green￿eld investment at a ￿xed
cost G, if it did not obtain the state assets in period 1. The foreign ￿rm then
lowers its costs from t to 0, by investing green￿eld. De￿ne ﬂ G(t) as the value of the
green￿eld cost, such that the foreign ￿rm is indiﬀerent between the alternatives of
supplying the market by exports, or by investing in new assets, kP, and producing
17Note that operating a new plant and operating the formerly state owned enterprise incur
the same marginal cost. A ￿rm is then implicitly assumed to also possess a ￿rm-speci￿c asset in
terms of technology. This technology can then easily be transferred to diﬀerent production units
within the ￿rm (see, Markusen (1995)). Even if there were a symmetric ￿xed cost associated
with restructuring the state-assets to make them as eﬃcient as the new assets, the results in
this section would still hold.






f (0) − πD
f (t) if t < tmax
πD
f (0) if t ≥ tmax.
(2.1)
Since export pro￿ts πD
f (t) decrease monotonically in t, the critical green￿eld cost
ﬂ G(t) is increasing in t and reaches its maximum at t = tmax.F o r t>t max,t h e
good is not exported and ﬂ G(t)=πD
f (0).
2.3. The privatization procedure
In practise, diﬀerent types of measures have been used to privatize former state-
owned enterprises. Several western countries employed various kinds of auctions
to sell state-owned enterprises to the highest bidder. In some transition countries,
a substantial fraction of the shares of all ￿rms were given to the general popula-
tion for free. In Eastern Germany, the Treuhandanstalt bargained on the terms of
trade and negotiated employment and investment guarantees. Most privatization
programs combined several elements of these basic methods.18 In order to focus
on the market forces as the determinant of the equilibrium buyer and the equi-
librium market structure, we assume that the government sells the state assets
to the highest bidder at an auction. More speci￿cally, the privatization process
is depicted as an auction where the two ￿r m sp o s tb i d sa n dt h eb i d d e rw i t ht h e
highest bid obtains the state assets. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to
his bid. The bids are assumed to be made simultaneously.19
18See Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997).
19All ￿rms are completely informed about their own and other ￿rms￿ characteristics. This
allows us to clearly attribute the market force eﬀects, as opposed to, say, problems of incomplete
information. Moreover, almost no literature derives optimal mechanisms for the selling of objects
which cause externalities on other potential buyers. As far as we know, Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996) and (1999) are the only papers on this subject.
10A bid (strategy) by one of the potential buyers is a real number bi ∈ R. The
sales mechanism α of the government is a function from R2 to {1,2}, de￿ning a
winner.
Deﬁnition 1. The sales mechanism α allocates the state assets to the ﬁrm post-
ing the highest bid for the assets. If more than one ﬁrm posts such a bid, each
such ﬁrm obtains the assets with equal probability.
The auctions will be solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.
There is assumed to be a smallest monetary unit, denoted ε. We assume ties
to be randomly broken, and all equalities in valuations to be ruled out. The
smallest amount ε is chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added
or subtracted.
Let us now turn to the ￿rms￿ valuations of an arbitrary distribution of the state
assets. Generally, these valuations do not only depend on the identity of ￿rm i,
but also on the identity of the ￿rm that will obtain the assets if ￿rm i does not.
Some notation is required in order to de￿ne a ￿rm￿s valuation. The case where
the state assets are liquidated is used as a reference point for interpretational
convenience, and the pro￿tf o r￿rm i is then denoted πi0. Similarly, we let πij
denote the pro￿tm a d eb y￿rm i when ￿rm j has acquired the state assets and
πii the pro￿tm a d eb y￿rm i when it has acquired the state assets itself. Then,
the valuation for ￿rm i, vij, is de￿ned:
Deﬁnition 2. vij ≡ πii − πij
We can rewrite vij =( πii −πi0)+(πi0 −πij). Thus, the valuation of obtaining
the assets for ￿rm i is the pro￿t increase caused by its asset expansion plus the
change in pro￿ts avoided by preventing ￿rm j from acquiring the state assets.
11I nt h ec a s ew i t ht w o￿rms in the industry, the analysis is straightforward as is
shown by the following lemma:20
Lemma 1. Let ﬁrm i be the ﬁrm with the highest valuation. The state assets
a r et h e na c q u i r e db yﬁrm i, at a price equal to the other ﬁrm’s, ﬁrm j’s, valuation
of obtaining the state assets instead of ﬁrm i, vji.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3. The equilibrium market structure
To proceed, one more de￿nition is required. To this end consider the situation
where no green￿eld investment takes place. Let t∗ be the value of the trade cost
satisfying the following equality: vfd = πD
f (0) − πD
f (t)=πD
d (t) − πD
d (0) = vfd.
Thus, t∗ is the trade cost at which the foreign and the domestic ￿rms￿ valuations of
the state assets coincide, given that no green￿eld investment takes place. We are
now set to derive the equilibrium market structures in the international oligopoly
presented above. The game is solved backwards and the following Proposition
identi￿es the equilibrium buyer, the equilibrium market structure and the equi-
librium auction price.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium buyer, the equilibrium auction price and the
equilibrium market structure are as follows:
(i) If G> ﬂ G(t) and t>t ∗, the domestic ﬁrm obtains the assets at a price
vfd = πD
f (0),w h e nt ≥ tmax, and at a price vfd = πD
f (0) − πD
f (t),w h e n
t<t max. The market structure is M(kP + kS,0).
20Note that the analysis becomes much more involved when there are three potential buyers
or more, since there might then exist multiple equilibria.
12(ii) If G> ﬂ G(t) and t<t ∗, the foreign ﬁrm obtains the assets at a price
vdf = πD
d (t) − πD
d (0). The market structure is M(kP,k S).
(iii) If G< ﬂ G(t), the foreign ﬁrm obtains the assets at a price vdf =0 .T h e
market structure is M(kP,k S).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 contains several noteworthy features. First, in the case where
the green￿eld costs are high, i.e. when G> ﬂ G(t), the Proposition shows that at
suﬃciently large trade costs, the domestic ￿rm obtains the state assets despite
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ef o r e i g n￿rm would save considerably on trade cost by obtaining
them. However, once the trade costs become suﬃciently high, this trade-cost
saving eﬀect is dominated by an anti-competitive eﬀect. The reason is that when
obtaining the state assets in this situation, the domestic ￿rm gains high market
power in the product market, since it faces a competitor with high trade costs.
Consequently, the domestic ￿rm obtains the state assets.
Second, in the case with low green￿eld costs, i.e. when G< ﬂ G(t), the Proposi-
tion shows that the foreign ￿rm obtains the state assets. The foreign ￿rm will now
switch from exports to green￿eld production in the case where it has not obtained
the state-assets. This implies that the domestic ￿rm can no longer prevent the
foreign ￿rm from enhancing its competitiveness in the product market and is thus
not willing to pay a high price for the state assets.
3.1. Why do low greenﬁe l dc o s t sa n dl o wt r a d ec o s t si n d u c ef o r e i g n
acquisitions?
The model above suggests that low green￿eld costs and low trade costs induce
foreign acquisitions. This seems counterintuitive at ￿rst sight, since lower green-
￿eld costs would be expected to lead to more green￿eld entry rather than entry by
13acquisition, and that lower trade costs would lead to more exports rather than en-
try. However, below this result is shown to be intuitive, when taking into account
that the levels of green￿eld costs and trade costs aﬀect the acquisition price.
First, observe that the aggregate pro￿ts in the diﬀerent market structures play
an important role for determining the equilibrium buyer. To see this, note that
Lemma 1 implies that the ￿rm with the highest valuation obtains the state assets.
Then, note that vij >v ji iﬀ πii + πji > πjj + πij,s ot h a tvij >v ji iﬀ Πi > Πj,
where Πi is the aggregate pro￿tw h e n￿rm i obtains the state assets and Πj is
the aggregate pro￿tw h e n￿rm j obtains them. Thus, the aggregate pro￿ti nt h e
market will play an important role for determining the equilibrium buyer.21
The aggregate pro￿ts in the diﬀerent possible market structures are illustrated
in ￿g 3.1. First, turn to the diagram in the middle, ￿g 3.1(ii). Note that the ag-
gregate pro￿t and thus the ￿rms￿ valuations depend on the foreign ￿rm￿s decision
to invest green￿e l di ns t a g et w o( c . f￿gure 2.1). Making use of ﬂ G(t),d e ￿ned in
(2.1) as the investment cost G which makes the foreign ￿rm indiﬀerent between
green￿eld investment and exports, we have two cases to consider. This is illus-
trated in ￿g 3.1(ii), where ﬂ G(t) is traced out in the tG−space. Points above ﬂ G(t)
then correspond to the case when green￿eld investment is not pro￿table, whereas
points below ﬂ G(t) correspond to the case where it is. Figures 3.1(i) and (ii) depict
aggregate pro￿ts in each of these cases. In the ensuing subsections, we will study
at the two separate cases more closely.
3.1.1. High greenﬁeld costs
Let us now characterize aggregate pro￿ts when the foreign ￿rm will not invest
green￿eld in stage 2 upon losing the auction in stage 1, as investment costs are
21Fosfuri et al (2000) show that the aggregate pro￿t will determine whether a MNE will export




) 0 ( Π
). t ( G G    costs,
greenfield   high   at







) k , k ( M S P
) k , k ( M S P
) 0 , ( S P k k M +
structure.
   market   and   buyer
  m equilibriu    The    ) ii (
) 0 Π(
G ) 0 Π( −
* t max t t
). t ( G G    costs,
greenfield   low   at






max t * t
Figure 3.1: The equilibrium market structure and aggregate pro￿ts.
15too high, i.e. G> ﬂ G(t). When the foreign ￿rm is the buyer of the state assets,
trade costs do no to aﬀect aggregate pro￿ts and Πf = Π(0). If the domestic
￿rm obtains the state assets, trade costs do aﬀect aggregate pro￿ts, since the
foreign ￿rm will export. The aggregate pro￿ti nt h i sc a s ei sg i v e nb yΠd = Π(t),
corresponding to the U-shaped curve in ￿gure 3.1(i).
To explain the shape of aggregate pro￿t in the latter case, let the aggregate
pro￿tb ee x p r e s s e da sΠ(t)=P(qd + qf)qd + P(qd + qf)qf − tqf.A s s h o w n i n











t − qf (3.1)
The ￿rst term in Equation (3.1) captures the anti-competitive eﬀect due to the
fact that an increased trade cost induces the foreign ￿rm to be less aggressive in
its market interaction, which softens competition and increases the revenues for
the domestic ￿rm. The second term re￿ects the decrease in total trade costs as
the domestic ￿rm steals business from the foreign ￿rm. This eﬀect is referred to
as the business stealing eﬀect. The third term, the direct trade cost eﬀect, reduces
aggregate pro￿ts relative to the initial position, as the foreign ￿rm faces higher
trade costs.
The U-shape of Π(t) can then be understood as follows. When t is zero, the
sales of the foreign ￿rm are large and an increase in trade costs t has a relatively
strong negative impact on aggregate pro￿ts through the direct trade cost eﬀect.
In addition, the business stealing eﬀect is zero, since the ￿rms￿ costs are the
same. Moreover, the anti-competitive eﬀect is limited, for the increased market
price induced by reduced industry supply then aﬀe c t sas m a l l e rn u m b e ro fu n i t s
produced by the domestic ￿rm.
It turns out that at t =0 ,t h etrade cost eﬀect dominates the anti-competitive
16eﬀect. At higher trade costs, however, the direct trade cost eﬀect is weaker
since the foreign ￿rm￿s exports are smaller. On the other hand, both the anti-
competitive and the business stealing eﬀects are stronger, since the domestic ￿rm
has a larger market share, and each unit shifted from the foreign ￿rm to the do-
mestic ￿rm implies larger cost savings. Hence, aggregate pro￿ts will rise, once
trade costs become suﬃciently high. When trade costs become suﬃciently high
at t = tmax, the domestic ￿rm becomes a monopolist and aggregate pro￿ts are
maximized.
Whether aggregate pro￿ts are maximized with the domestic or the foreign
￿rms as the buyer depends on the balance between the incentive to form Π(0)
to avoid the higher trade cost, and the anti-competitive and business stealing
incentive to form Π(t). Comparing Πd = Π(t) and Πf = Π(0) in ￿gure 3.1(i), we
can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that G> ﬂ G(t),t h e n
(i): Πd > Πf if t ≥ t∗
(ii): Πf > Πd if t<t ∗
Proof. See Appendix
When trade costs are low, the domestic ￿rm can no longer prevent the foreign
￿rm from becoming a tough competitor and thus, its willingness to pay for the
state assets decreases. Consequently, a foreign acquisition is then more likely.
3.1.2. Low greenﬁeld costs
In this case, the foreign ￿rm will invest green￿eld in stage 2 upon losing the
auction in stage 1, as investment costs are suﬃciently low, i.e. G< ﬂ G(t). If the
domestic ￿rm acquires the state assets, the foreign ￿rm invests green￿eld and
17aggregate pro￿ts are Πd = Π(0)− G. If the foreign ￿rm acquires the state assets,
investment costs are avoided and aggregate pro￿ts are Πf = Π(0). Consequently,
we obtain the following result, illustrated by ￿gure 3.1(iii):
Lemma 3. Assume that G< ﬂ G(t),t h e nΠf > Πd.
Intuitively, the lower green￿eld cost decreases the domestic ￿rm￿s willingness
to pay, since the foreign ￿rm can credibly threaten to enter green￿eld, if it does
not obtain the state assets. At the same time, the foreign ￿rm is willing to pay
G for the state assets and obtains them.
4. Policy
A central question is whether the privatization procedure selects the socially most
preferred buyer. A fundamental problem in determining the most preferred buyer
is that the equilibrium price of the state asset is aﬀected by government policy.
The endogenous nature of the buyer￿s identity and the auction price in the present
a n a l y s i s ,a sw e l la st h ei n t e r n a t i o n a ld i m e n s i o n ,i m p l yt h a tt h eo p t i m a ld e s i g no f
policy is very complicated. Therefore, we will make a couple of remarks on policy
that might indicate areas worthy of future investigations.
4.1. National Treatment Clauses in Privatizations
The basic idea behind national treatment clauses is the commitment of countries
to treat foreign-controlled ￿rms operating in their territories no less favorably than
domestic enterprises in similar situations. In the policy debate on FDI, it has been
of concern that FDI might ￿crowd out￿ domestic investments and shift pro￿ts
from domestic to foreign ￿rms.22 Here, we will illuminate the concept of national
22World Investment Report, 1999.
18treatment in the context of privatizations. More speci￿cally, we compare two
policies: (i) a national treatment (NT) policy, where no discrimination between
domestic and foreign buyers occurs, and (ii) a protectionism (P) policy, where
only domestic buyers are allowed to acquire the state assets.23
The conventional welfare evaluation of M&As and market structures in an
international oligopoly is typically made by comparing the sum of domestic con-
sumer surplus and domestic pro￿ts in diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e s .W ef o l l o wt h i s
approach but add the sales price of the state assets into the domestic welfare
measure. It then follows that the NT and P policies only diﬀer when the foreign
￿rm obtains the state assets under the NT policy. The reason is that the price
paid by the domestic ￿rm when obtaining the state assets does not aﬀect the wel-
fare level, since it is only a transfer between the domestic ￿rm and the domestic
government. Let WNT
f denote the welfare level when the foreign ￿rm obtains the
state asset under the NT policy, and let W P
d denote the welfare level under the P






=[ vdf + CSf + πdf ] − [CSd + πdd] (4.1)
There are three terms in W NT
f : First, the sale of the state assets generates rev-
enues. As shown in Lemma 1, the foreign ￿rm pays the valuation of the domestic
￿rm, i.e. vdf . The second term is the consumer surplus when the foreign ￿rm is
the equilibrium buyer, denoted CSf. The consumer surplus depends on the trade
cost faced by the foreign ￿rm and thus CSf = CS(0) and CSd = CS(t). Finally,
the domestic ￿rm￿s pro￿t when the state assets are in the hands of the foreign
￿rm is πdf .
23Note that we focus on the eﬀects in Country H and thus abstract from the eﬀects in Country
F. Moreover, we abstract from how the policies are determined.
19W P
d are derived in the same fashion. Note that since the sales price for the state
assets is just a redistribution from the domestic ￿rm to the domestic government,
t h es a l e sp r i c ei sn o ti n c l u d e di nW P
d .
We can then rewrite (4.1):
WNT−P = vdf − (πdd − πdf )+CS(0) − CS(t)
= CS(0) − CS(t) ≥ 0 (4.2)
This (weak) inequality always holds since aggregate output will be higher in the
market structure without trade costs: When green￿eld entry is not credible, G>
ﬂ G(t), foreign ownership increases consumer surplus and, hence, welfare since either
the trade cost, or the monopoly position of the domestic ￿rm is avoided. When
green￿eld entry is credible, G< ﬂ G(t), foreign and domestic ownership lead to the
same welfare, since the selling price is zero and the consumer surplus will be the
same under either ￿rm￿s acquisition.
Hence, we conclude:
Corollary 1. The National Treatment policy yields at least as high domestic
welfare as the Protectionism policy.
The intuition of this result follows directly from the ￿rst line in (4.2): The
foreign ￿rm pays a price equal to the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation of the state assets
- but the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation, vdf , is precisely the negative impact on this
￿rm through the decline in pro￿ts created by the foreign acquisition, πdd − πdf .
This result also illustrates a fundamental diﬀerence between foreign entry in
the context of acquisition and green￿eld investment. In the case where only
green￿eld entry is an option, the above reasoning concerning the consumer eﬀect is
still valid. However, the rent shifting eﬀect will now have diﬀerent welfare eﬀects.
To see this, note that, when entering, the foreign ￿rm will pay a ￿xed entry cost
20G which only covers the opportunity cost in terms of factor inputs. However, the
negative eﬀect on the domestic ￿rm￿s pro￿t is not ￿paid for￿. Consequently, the
issue of national treatment in the context of M & A diﬀers from the context of
green￿eld, since in the former, but not in the latter, some of the rent shifting
created by the investment is partly paid for by the foreign investor.24
4.2. Investment and trade policy
The preceding section dealt with the preferred buyer, taking investment and trade
policy as given. We now elaborate on trade and investment policy, taking the
privatization-auction, de￿n e di nS e c t i o n2 . 3 ,a sg i v e n . G o v e r n m e n t sc a na ﬀect
investment costs in numerous ways. For instance, location subsides and tax re-
ductions can contribute to lower investment costs. Trade policy can be performed
by using tariﬀs or by employing various measures inhibiting import competition,
such as border controls. Let us then assume that the government can aﬀect the
green￿eld cost G and the trade cost t the foreign ￿rm must face. In order to high-
light the strategic eﬀects of the investment and trade policy, subsidies or taxes
are assumed not to directly aﬀect the government￿s budget. Welfare is then given
24This ￿nding does not imply that NT policy always leads to higher welfare, however. The
domestic ￿rm might be the socially preferred buyer, if there are several domestic ￿rms, since
the acquirer does not pay for the aggregate externalities its acquisition creates. Moreover, in
a more general set-up, a domestic buyer might be preferred since its acquisition might lead to
more foreign green￿eld investments.
Note also that a partially discriminatory policy might be socially preferred to the NT policy,
since the government might then be able to capture a larger share of the foreign ￿rm￿s rents.






vdf + CSf + πdf , when the foreign ￿rm obtains the state assets.
CSd + πdd, when the domestic ￿rm obtains the state assets.
(4.3)
The design of investment and trade policy will be complicated by the fact that
it does not only aﬀect the ￿rms￿ incentives for green￿eld investment and exports,25
but also aﬀects the sales price at the auction. In order to simplify the analysis,
we make the following assumption:
Assumption A1 P =1− Q
In ￿gure 4.1, we illustrate how welfare is aﬀected by investment and trade
policy. The corresponding equilibrium market structures are indicated by arrows.
Trade policy: Trade costs aﬀect both the price paid at the auction and the
identity of the buyer. When green￿eld costs are suﬃciently high and trade costs
are low, G> ﬂ G(t) and t<t ∗, the foreign ￿rm obtains the state assets. A small
increase in trade costs then implies that the foreign ￿rm still obtains the state
assets, but must pay a higher price for these assets, since the domestic ￿rm￿s
valuation has increased, due to the strengthened anti-competitive eﬀect of higher
trade costs (c.f equation (3.1) ). Consequently, welfare increases since the product
market equilibrium is unaﬀected. Thus, we have the following result:26
Corollary 2. Increased trade barriers can increase domestic welfare without in-
creasing the proﬁto ft h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm or the tax income by forcing a foreign
buyer to pay more for the state assets.
25See, for instance, Markusen (1997) and Sanna-Randaccio (1996) on this issue.
26Note that this result would not be aﬀected if revenues were assumed to be generated from
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Figure 4.1: Welfare in the diﬀerent market structures.
However, a larger increase might lead to the domestic ￿rm obtaining the state
assets. The government then no longer extracts foreign pro￿ts. Moreover, the
domestic ￿rm￿s acquisition leads to lower consumer surplus, since the price in the
product market will be higher. These two eﬀects outweigh the eﬀect of increased
pro￿ts for the domestic ￿rm, leading to lower aggregate welfare, as shown in ￿gure
4.1. Moreover, if trade costs are increased for medium size investment costs, this
might lead to the foreign ￿rm having a credible green￿eld threat This, in turn,
might lead to a loss in sales revenues as the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation of the state
assets falls to zero.
Investment policy: Investment subsidies might reduce welfare, also when
it leads to increased investments and when associated with no direct costs. By
encouraging FDI through green￿eld entry, the revenues from selling the state
assets decrease, since the value for the domestic ￿rm of owning the state assets
23decreases. For example, if green￿eld costs are suﬃciently high and trade costs
are low, that is G> ﬂ G(t) and t<t ∗, the foreign ￿rm obtains the state assets.
If investment costs are reduced, this might lead to a loss of sales revenues if G
is reduced below ﬂ G(t), as the domestic ￿rm￿s valuation of the state assets falls
to zero. This implies that the government can no longer extract foreign pro￿ts.
Since the product market equilibrium is unaﬀected, we have the following result:27
Corollary 3. Investment subsidies to foreign ﬁrms might reduce domestic wel-
fare, since these do not necessarily increase investments but only reduce the sales
price of the state assets.
Finally, the ￿gure also illustrates that welfare will jump discontinuously from
changes in trade and investment policy as this leads to changes in the equilibrium
market structure.28 It turns out that the highest welfare in the model will be for
high green￿eld costs and medium high trade costs. The reason is that the sales
price increases with the trade costs in this interval, as it leads to a stronger anti-
competitive and business stealing eﬀect and a weaker trade cost savings eﬀect (c.f
equation (3.1) ).
5. Robustness of results
The model in this paper is obviously restrictive in several respects. In this section,
we show that the mechanisms highlighted in the model are also at work in a
more general set-up. Three diﬀerent extensions will be considered separately;
(a) allowing for more general assumptions about costs, demand, and mode of
27This result would be strengthened if assuming investment subsidies not to be costless.
28Horstmann and Markusen (1992) showed that these jumps are a characteristic of markets
with MNEs.
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Figure 5.1: The general three-stage game.
competition, (b) increasing the number of ￿rms, and (c) allowing for exports from
country H.
5.0.1. Assumptions on costs, demand and the mode of competition
To this end, consider an extended version of the model as illustrated in ￿gure 5.1.
Some more notation is need before proceeding: k0 denotes the private domestic
￿rm￿s initial capital stock, whereas kP denotes the capital stock generated by
either of the ￿rms by investing in period 2. Let ￿rm w (winner) be the ￿rm that
obtained the state asset in period 1, and ￿rm l (loser) the ￿rm that did not. Then,
use πkw,kl
w (t) as short-hand for pro￿ts, where kw is the number of assets possessed
by ￿rm w,w h e r e a skl is the number of assets in ￿rm l.
For a high enough green￿eld costs, it follows that no ￿rm invests in the green-
￿eld game in period 2. Lemma 1 then establishes that the domestic ￿rm obtains




f (t) > π
kS,k0
f (0) + π
k0,kS
d (0) and the foreign ￿rm
obtains the assets iﬀ the inequality is reversed. It then follows that the inequality
holds for a suﬃciently large t, since the domestic ￿rm becomes a monopolist if
obtaining the state assets. Moreover, if cost synergies are assumed to be associ-
ated with combining the state assets with private assets, the reasoning above also
holds.
Second, the observation that low green￿eld costs for foreign ￿rms lead to
foreign acquisitions is not speci￿c to the above model either. To see this, consider
the situation where the foreign ￿rm, but not the domestic ￿rm, would invest
green￿eld if the other ￿rm obtained the state assets, and where no ￿rm would
make an additional investment. It then follows from Lemma 1 that the foreign











f denotes the green￿e l dc o s to ft h ef o r e i g n￿rm. This inequality holds as
long as the increase in aggregate pro￿ts from adding new capital is less than the
cost for the foreign ￿rm, GN
f . Since a decrease in the foreign ￿rm￿s variable cost
typically decreases the domestic ￿rm￿s pro￿ts, this inequality will hold in several
oligopoly models for some parameter values.
Thus, the ￿nding that low green￿eld costs and low trade costs are conducive to
foreign acquisitions and high green￿eld costs and high trade costs are conducive
to domestic acquisitions is not speci￿c to the model presented above.
5.0.2. More ﬁrms
Consider a situation with D domestic ￿rms and F foreign ￿rms. Let π
kS,0
D1 (t;1,D−
1,F,0) denote the pro￿tf o rt h ed o m e s t i c￿rm, D1, when it obtains the state assets
and no ￿rm invests in period 2, and π
0,kS
F1 (t;1,D−1,F,0) the pro￿t for the foreign
￿rm F1 when D1 obtains the state assets and no ￿rm invests in period 2. The
second entry in the parenthesis refers to the number of ￿r m sw i t hb o t hs t a t e
26assets and private assets, the third entry refers to the number of single asset
domestic ￿rms, the fourth entry refers to the number of foreign ￿rms which have
n o ti n v e s t e di nc o u n t r yHa n dt h e￿fth entry refers to the number of foreign ￿rms
having invested in country H.
For high enough green￿eld costs, it follows that no ￿rm invests in the green-
￿e l dg a m ei np e r i o d2 .F r o mt h es a m er e a s o n i n ga si nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1 ,i t
follows that there exists an equilibrium where a domestic ￿rm obtains the state
assets if π
kS,0
D1 (t;1,D− 1,F,0) + π
0,kS
F1 (t;1,D− 1,F,0) > π
0,kS
D1 (t;0,D,F− 1,1) +
π
kS,0
F1 (t;0,D,F− 1,1). This condition holds for a suﬃciently large t and for suﬃ-
ciently large cost synergies associated with combining the state assets with private
assets.29
For low enough green￿eld costs, it follows that foreign ￿rms invest in the
green￿e l dg a m ei np e r i o d2 .F r o mt h es a m er e a s o n i n ga si nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a
1, it then follows that there exists an equilibrium where a foreign ￿rm obtains the



















Thus, the ￿nding that low green￿eld costs and low trade costs are conducive to
foreign acquisitions and high green￿eld costs and high trade costs are conducive
to domestic acquisitions extends to a multi-￿rm setting.
29Note that in the Cournot model, with two domestic ￿rms or more, without complementarity
between state and private assets, it can be shown that the foreign ￿rm will always acquire the
SOE. On the other hand, if ￿rms compete a la Bertrand with diﬀerentiated products, the result
that a domestic ￿rm acquires the state assets at high trade costs holds. The reason is that all
￿rms bene￿tf r o mad o m e s t i c￿rm obtaining the state assets, since higher trade costs weaken
price competition.
275.0.3. Bilateral trade and investments
Consider now a situation where the domestic ￿rm could export or invest in the
market in country F. Assume the markets to be segmented on the demand side.
It then follows that the results derived in the model still hold. To see this, note
that the domestic ￿rm￿s costs are not aﬀected by whether it obtains the state
assets. Furthermore, note that a foreign ￿rm will never export from its foreign
location to its home country, since its costs are at least as low producing in its
domestic market. Consequently, allowing for exports and foreign investment by
the domestic ￿rm will not aﬀect the results derived here. If there are cost synergies
associated with combining the state assets with private assets, the analysis will
be more complicated, however, since a domestic ￿rm￿s level of exports might
be aﬀected by whether it obtains the state assets or not. However, the same
reasoning as for the proof of Lemma 1 still applies, so that the aggregate pro￿ts
in the market play an important role as the determinant of the equilibrium buyer.
Consequently, the mechanisms identi￿ed here still play a role for determining the
equilibrium buyer.
6. Concluding discussion
This paper determines the emerging equilibrium market structure in a mixed in-
ternational oligopoly where the state enterprise is sold at an auction. The model
suggests that low green￿eld costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions.
The reason is that domestic ￿rms can then not prevent foreign ￿rms from be-
coming locally strong competitors and thus, their willingness to pay for the state
assets are low.
The paper points to the fact that the potential negative eﬀects of a national
treatment clause through crowding out is partly mitigated in privatizations, since
28the negative impact on domestic ￿rms created by the acquisition is partly paid for
by the foreign investor in the bidding competition over the state assets. The paper
also points to the fact that investment and trade policies can be used strategically
to improve the outcome of the privatization procedure by increasing the selling
price.
The issue of optimal design of the privatization policy has not been addressed
here. The complexity of the externalities involved in the selling of the state assets
indicates that informational constraint will be important for deriving optimal
policies. A natural step, however, is to explicitly model this restriction and to
investigate whether selling rules incurring a higher welfare level than the ones
using only information about nationality, might be found.
29A. Appendix
A . 1 .P r o o fo fL e m m a1
In this proof, we will use the following more general notation of the valuation of
the state-assets: Generally, the valuations of the state assets do not only depend
on the identity of ￿rm i, but also on the identity of the ￿rm obtaining the assets,
￿rm j, and on the identity of the ￿rm that will obtain the assets if ￿rm j does not,
that is, ￿rm h. Some notation is required in order to de￿ne a ￿rm￿s valuation.
Let K ≡ (k1,k 2,k s).L e tKj denote the vector of capital stocks after ￿rm j has
obtained the state assets and πi(Kj) denote the pro￿tm a d eb y￿rm i when ￿rm
j has acquired the state assets. Then, the valuation for ￿rm i, v
jh
i , is de￿ned as
v
jh





j without loss of generality. First, consider the equilibrium candi-
date where ￿rm i acquires the state assets. Consider the equilibrium candidate
b∗,w h e r eb∗
i >b ∗




i is a weakly dominated strategy, since no owner will post a bid over
its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets. If b∗
i <v
ji
j , ￿rm j bene￿ts from
deviating to b∗∗
j = b∗
i + ε, since it then obtains the assets according to De￿nition
1 and pays a price for the assets which is lower than its valuation of obtaining






j − ε. Then, no owner has an
incentive to deviate. Thus, this is a Nash equilibrium and the only NE where ￿rm
i obtains the assets.
Let us now show that this is the only Nash equilibrium.
First, consider the situation where ￿rm j obtains the assets. Consider the
equilibrium candidate b∗,w h e r eb∗
j >b ∗








30￿rm i bene￿ts from deviating to b∗∗
i = b∗
j + ε, since it then obtains the assets
according to De￿nition 1 and pays a price for the assets which is lower than
its valuation of obtaining them. Thus, ￿rm j obtaining the assets is not an
equilibrium.
Second, note that the situation where neither ￿rm i nor ￿rm j obtains the
assets cannot occur if there is no reservation price at the auction.
A . 2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Lemma 1 implies that the ￿rm with the highest valuation, ￿rm i, obtains the
assets at a price vji.
(i)I fG> ﬂ G(t) and t>t ∗. In this interval, ￿rm f will not undertake a green￿eld
investment. It then follows from Lemma 2 that ￿rm d obtains the assets at a price
πd
f(0),w h e nt ≥ tmax, and at a price πd
f(0) − πd
f(t) when t<t max.
(ii)I fG> ﬂ G(t) and t<t ∗. In this interval, ￿rm f will not undertake a
green￿eld investment. It then follows from Lemma 2 that ￿rm f obtains the
assets at a price πd
d(t) − πd
d(0).
(iii)I fG< ﬂ G(t). In this interval, ￿rm f will undertake a green￿eld investment.
It then follows from Lemma 3 that ￿rm f obtains the assets at a price 0.
A.3. Derivation of (3.1)
Aggregate pro￿t, Π = πd + πf,w h e r e
πd = P(qd + qf)qd (A.1)








= P + P
0qf − t =0 (A.4)

























where D = P 0 [3P0 + P 00Q] > 0 and Q = qd + qf.W ec a nt h e nd e ￿ne aggregate
pro￿ts as a function of t:
Π(t)=πd(qd(t),q f(t),t)+πf(qd(t),q f(t),t) (A.6)































A . 4 .P r o o fo fL e m m a2
First, we rewrite Π(t) by inserting (A.5) into (A.7). De￿ning the elasticities
βQ = P00
P0 Q and βqd = P00















We then proceed by deriving the following Lemma:
32Lemma 4. (i) dΠ
dt (0) < 0, (ii) Π(tmax) > Π(0),a n d( i i i )Π(t) has a global mini-
mum ￿ t for t ∈ [0,t max].
Proof. If demand P(Q) is concave βQ ≥ 0 and βqd ≥ 0, since P 0 < 0 and P00 ≤ 0.
Then:
(i) At t =0 ,w em u s th a v eqd = qf, which implies dΠ
dt (0) = −q
2+βQ
3+βQ < 0.
(ii) At t = tmax, ￿rm d becomes a monopolist and thus Π(tmax) > Π(0).
(iii) De￿ne ￿ t by dΠ
dt (￿ t)=0 . Using (A.9), and the de￿nitions of βQ and βqd,t h i s




2P 0 + P 00Q
2P0 + P00qd
=0 (A.10)
Again, note that dΠ
dt (0) = −q
2+βQ
3+βQ < 0. Also, note that lim
ε→0
dΠ
dt (tmax − ε)=∞.
Then, since
qd
qf − 1 is monotonically increasing in t,w h e r e a s
2P0+P00Q
2P0+P00qd is strictly






only once and hence, the aggregate pro￿t Π(t) has a unique global minimum at
t = ￿ t.
A.5. Derivation of Figure 4.1
The ￿gure is derived under Assumption A1.
A.5.1. Period 3
Quantities and pro￿ts in the three market structures are given in Figure A.1.
A.5.2. Period 2
From the information in Figure A.1, it can be shown that (2.1), that is, the


































































Figure A.1: Quantities and pro￿ts in the diﬀerent market structures.












where tmax = 1
2.
A.5.3. Period 1
Figure A.2 summarizes the ￿rms￿ valuations vfd and vdf , the equilibrium market
structure M(kd,k f), consumer surplus CS , revenues for the government R and
welfare W.












































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2: The ￿rms valuations, the equilibrium market structure, sales price of
the state assets, consumer surplus and welfare.
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